Navigating The Perfect Storm Perspectives on Prospects for Shipbuilding

1
Navigating The Perfect StormPerspectives
onProspects for Shipbuilding

• Adam B. Siegel
• Northrop Grumman Analysis Center
• IDGA, November 2005

The views expressed in this briefing are those of
the author and not necessarily those of the
Northrop Grumman Corporation.
2
Caveat

• Briefing does not
• (necessarily)
• represent the views of the
• Northrop Grumman Corporation.

3
Shipbuilding faces a Perfect Storm

• Steaming a course rocked by
• Strategic change
• From the Soviet Union to al Qaeda and beyond
• Developing doctrinal concepts
• E.g., translating Sea Basing to programs
• Navy Riverine force, 1000 ship fleet
• Management change
• Capability Based planning (for example)
• Uncertainty over future U.S. Navy fleet size
• E.g., no existing defined Navy force structure
• Significant fiscal pressure
• Iraq, Deficits, Katrina, Baby Boomers,
• DOD Budget growth peaking

4
Leadership Transition

• Chief of Naval Operations
• Admiral Clark
• Readiness as priority
• Warfighting
• Savings to procurement not fully realize
• Admiral Mullen
• Seeking to establish clear force structure goals
• Directives for shipbuilding stability
• Striving to identify additional funding
• Civilian leadership in transition as well

5
Balancing the Three Rs
Requirements
The3 Rs
Resources
Risk
Risk is inherent in everything we do. Managing
it should be a continuous process that permeates
but does not dominate our daily lives. Every
Navy leader should be able to take prudent risks
in the conduct of their actions. CNO Guidance
for 2006
6
Balancing the Three Rs
Requirements Working to Define
The3 Rs
Risk Developing Metrics
Resources Seeking toIncrease
7

• "What I am anxious to do is present some level
  of stability to the industry, and it's my belief
  that once we get them to some level of stability
  they are charged with cost reduction. But if I
  change my plan year to year, which has happened
  too often, it's very difficult for them to be
  able to plan. So getting a number, getting one
  that they can depend on, developing capabilities
  we need, doing it consistently will be a
  significant step forward in my belief to
  stabilizing the shipbuilding world."
• Admiral Michael Mullen, U.S. Navy
• Chief of Naval Operations
• Quoted in Geoff Fein, CNO Wants A Stable
  Shipbuilding Industrial Base, Rapid ASW
  Prototyping, Defense Daily, 17 Oct 05

8
Alternative Shipbuilding PlansCNO Tasking
Memo, 25 July 05

• "several effects desired of this review"
• A ""Fencing" a particular amount of TOA on an
  annual basis to form a steady foundation of
  funding to stabilize the Industrial Base ..."
• C Better management of warship requirements --
  and changes to those requirements.
• D "Identification of statutory or regulatory
  barriers that impede efficiencies in our
  shipbuilding plan along with recommendations for
  change."
• E "... How to reduce the overall number of
  classes of ships and move towards more modular
  and multi-purpose ship designs."
• F "Foundation for re-defining the size of the
  Naval Force in terms of absolute numbers, as well
  as annual cash flows to industry and
  capabilities."

9
CNO Guidance for 2006

• Objective 2
• "Determine and delivers on the Navy's future
  force structure requirements by a) defining an
  improved force structure and construction plan
  and, b) contributing to a stable industrial
  base.
• Desired Effect 2
• Navy's long-range shipbuilding plan is aligned
  with the results of the Quadrennial Defense
  Review (QDR) and fiscally supported within the
  program of record and the budget process.

10
CNO 2006 Guidance (2) Tasks to Support
Objectives / Effects

• N8 Craft a detailed plan (based upon
  cost/capability analysis of shipbuilding programs
  ) that specifically addresses capability,
  affordability, stabilization of the Ship
  Construction Navy (SCN) account, and sustainment
  of the industrial base.
• N8/CFFC Align aircraft acquisition plans,
  shipbuilding plans, the Sea Basing concept, and
  Joint Operational concepts.

11
Statement of Admiral Vern Clark, U.S. Navy,
before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Posture Statement, 10 Feb 2005
12
Understanding shipbuilding costs

• Focus on Cost Growth occurs
• Comparing apples to oranges
• Without full understanding of issues
• Without placing into context first in class
• What is cost?
• Procurement?
• Total Ownership / Life-Cycle?
• U.S. Navy ships should cost more than other
  navies ships
• Taking Care of Sea Warriors
• Mission Requirements
• Global Presence

13
A 30 Solution?

• Multi-ship buys
• Advanced Appropriations
• Limit requirements growth / change orders
• Open-door government oversight
• Full life-cycle contracting

14
Dominance In and From the Maritime Commons
A call for a robust 21st Century National Fleet
15
Challenge Considering Future Fleet Requirements

• How to provide these capabilities
• In face of resource constraints?
• To control risks?
• While creating future opportunities?
• Bounding the problem
• Capabilities much more than
• Counting of specific platforms
• Platforms not just ships
• But it is necessity to translate capabilities to
  numbers
• First order choices
• Start with ships as core element of fleet
• Build on others work through meta-analysis

16
Analyzing the Maritime Future

• Future Fleet Architecture (FFA) Studies
• Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)
• Office of Force Transformation (OFT)
• Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
  (CSBA)
• Other work including
• Congressional Research Service (CRS)
• Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
• RAND Corporation (e.g., on Deepwater reqts)
• Heritage (e.g., on National Fleet)
• Government documents including
• Navy Interim 30-year Shipbuilding Plan
• Navy 3/1 Strategy (draft)

17
Risks and Opportunities

• Risk
• Operational risks
• Future challenges risks
• Force management risks
• Institutional risks 1
• Opportunity
• Protection of current option space
• Creation of new options for decision-makers

1 As defined in The National Defense Strategy
of the United States of America, Department of
Defense, March 2005, page 11.
18
Office of Force Transformation

• Proposed radical new Fleet concepts/approaches
• Based on network-centric, complexity concepts
• Argues for speed and numbers
• Suggested multiple new ship classes with new
  operational concepts
• E.g., Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) submarines
  carried to theater on another ship
• Numbers of platforms key
• Large option 810 combatants with 1,368 UxVs
• Notes
• Minimal mention of Coast Guard
• No transition plan from todays to transformed
  Navy
• Uncertain metrics re industrial base

19
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

• Study grounded in history
• Robust examination of U.S. naval history
• Study explicitly dollar limited with 12
  billion / year available for Navy shipbuilding
• Notional new national battle fleet
• Suggests new 500 ship battle fleet explicitly
  counts / considers Coast Guard assets
• Cost drives many issues / conclusions
• Construction yard specialization
• Modification of existing build programs to meet
  MPF(F) requirements
• Notes
• Potentially undervalues PRC / near-peer threat
• Industrial base recommendations merit deeper
  study

20
A 500 Ship Naval Platform Architecture for
the National Total Force Battle Network

• 12 (10?) SSBNs
• 60 nuclear-powered submarines, including
• 53 SSNs (dropping slightly over the next 12
  years)
• 6 (8?) SSGNs
• 1 Special Mission Submarine
• 15 aviation power projection platforms,
• - 10 J-CVNs
• 4 J-CVEs
• 1 J-AFSB
• 84 (86?) AEGIS/VLS surface combatants, including
• 22 CG-52s
• 34 (36?) DDG-79s
• 28 DDG-51s
• 84 LCSs
• 91 USCG Deepwater Cutters

• 50 sea-based maneuver platforms,
• 8 LHD-1s
• 24 LPD-17s
• 16 MPF(E)s
• 2 upgraded T-AVBs
• 68 NFAF ships, including
• 8 T-AOE/T-AOE(X)s
• 11 T-AKEs
• 17 T-AOs
• 8 (?) T-LKAs
• 2 T-AHs
• 4 JCCXs
• 5 Fleet Support Tenders
• 4 Salvage Ships
• 5 Fleet Tugs
• 4 Ocean Surveillance Ships
• 35 Prepositioning and surge ships

21
Center for Naval Analyses

• Closely engaged with U.S. Navy analysis
• Near surrogate for Navy concepts / plan of 2004
• Heavily reliant on new deployment approaches
• Forward basing
• Crew Swap
• Deploying ships / rotating crews
• Provided for a range of fleet sizes
• Differentiation principally success of
  alternative deployment approaches
• Low fleet size 265 hulls
• High fleet size 380 ships
• Note
• No mention of U.S. Coast Guard
• No industrial base discussion of note

22
Admiral Clarks Plan
Statement of Admiral Vern Clark, U.S. Navy,
before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Posture Statement, 10 Feb 2005
23
Themes related to future fleet architectures

• Navy / Maritime forces at a crossroads
• New operational concepts developing for
• New operational environment amid
• Significant fiscal constraints and
• Uncertainty over future platforms and platform
  numbers
• Controlling risk is multi-faceted
• Fiscal, Operational, Future
• Basic questions
• What are the maritime missions?
• Warfighting
• Maintaining order in and from the maritime
  commons
• Architecture for what fleet?
• OFT / CNA U.S. Navy
• CSBA U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard

24
Forging the Future Fleet

• Realities
• Fleets take a long time to build and change
• Rapid rudder orders can create risk and cost
• Analysis suggests that the Nation
• Exploit where possible existing production to
  meet future capability requirements
• Manage Americas maritime forces as a whole
• Focus the U.S. Navy on shaping strategic choices
• Create an aggressive Maritime research and
  experimentation program for potential
  breakthrough technologies and capabilities

A Robust, Capable Navy with a true National Fleet
to achieve Navy-Coast Guard synergies to provide
maritime capabilities through the full spectrum
of QDR and national security challenges.
25
Outlining the fleet

• National Fleet
• Joint/Interagency force
• Navy, Coast Guard, other services ships
• Issues meriting future examination
• Balance in numbers, roles, capabilities between
  USCG cutters and U.S. Navy littoral combat ships
• Marginal investments to enable full-spectrum
  engagement capacities across the entire fleet
• Determining presence requirements in the coming
  decades
• Presence often drives ship requirements
• e.g., One ship cant be two places at once

26
Presence requirements

• 8 Constabulary hubs
• Require various levels of constant presence
• East / West coasts of Africa
• Persian Gulf
• South East Asia / Oceania
• Caribbean
• U.S. Coastal Areas (Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico,
  Pacific, Alaska/Hawaii/Guam)
• 2 Warfighting hubs
• Require some level of presence with tethered
  responsiveness for crisis / war
• East Asia / North East Asia
• Arabian Gulf

27
Determining presence requirements in GWOT
theater

28
Determining Force Structure Requirements --
West Coast of Africa Example

• Gulf of Guinea Hub
• 2.5 constabulary presence
• Assume 4 month USCG deployment
• 5.25 CG / year for 1.0 presence
• Assume 6 month USN deployment
• 4.0 USN / year for 1.0 presence
• Roughly 10 USCG / 2.5 USN total reqt
• .25 Expeditionary Strike Group presence
• Historically based requirement (NEOs)
• 4.0 USN / year for 1.0 presence
• Minimum 2 L-ships
• Roughly 2 L-ships for total reqt

29
Factors driving force structure

• Defining requirements
• Presence requirements combined with
• Major Combat Operations war-fighting capacities
  with
• Reinforcing / swing capacities
• Reflecting
• Resource constraints
• Potential alternative operational concepts
• Controlling risk
• Suggests a potential 202x National Fleet
  composition along the following lines

30
The 21st Century 600 Ship National Fleet

• 56 Sea-based Maneuver Platforms
• 10 LHDs / LHA(R)s
• 28 LPD-17s
• 16 MPF(E)
• 2 T-AVBs
• 68 Auxiliaries
• 90 Prepositioning / Surge / Research ships
• Including 44 Joint High Speed Vessels (J-HSV) /
  Theater Support Vessels (TSVs)
• Including 11 NOAA research ships above 1000 tons

• 12 SSBNs
• 56 SSNs / SSGNs
• 15 aviation power projection platforms
• 10 J-CVNs
• 4 J-CVEs
• 1 J-AFSB
• 96 VLS Surface Ships
• 22 CG-52s (? CG(X))
• 62 DDG-51s
• 12 DD(X) / land-attack
• 200-240 USN LCS / USCG Deepwater cutters

Note National Fleet expanding beyond USN / USCG
conceptually to include all U.S. Government
maritime assets with a global role, including
USA/USAF prepositioning ships and NOAA
ships. Note Displayed notional fleet
composition is 593 to 633 ships.
31
Conclusion

• Shipbuilding facing a perfect storm
• Leadership dedicated to charting and navigating a
  course through this storm
• Real options exist to improve the nations, the
  Navys, and industrys ability to navigate the
  storm

32
BACKUPS
33
The GWOT Central Theater Defines an Operational
Battlespace Different Than Those Found in Past US
Wars

Note the map outline shows the Islamic Caliphate
at its height
34
Determining Force Structure Requirements --
Northeast Asia Example

• Warfighting Dominance Force
• 2.0 Ballistic Missile Defense
• 3.0 USN / year from Japan to make 1.0 presence
• 5.5 from Hawaii / CONUS to make 1.0 presence
• 8.5 ship requirement
• .75 CSG / .75 ESG based in Japan
• 2.0 SSN / SSGN _at_ 4.5 to make 1.0 9.0
  requirement
• Reinforcing forces lt 14 days
• Two CSGs
• ESG MPF(F)
• 8 SSNs / SSGNs
• Constabulary capabilities _at_ 1.5 constabulary
  presence
• Assume 4 month USCG deployment _at_ 6.25 CG / year
  for 1.0
• USN (LCS) from Japan _at_ 2.5 USN / year for 1.0
  presence
• Roughly 6.25 USCG / 2.5 USN total requirement