Panel Perspective: Research Directions for Security and Networking in Critical Real-Time and Embedded Systems - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

About This Presentation

Panel Perspective: Research Directions for Security and Networking in Critical Real-Time and Embedded Systems


1. Panel Perspective: Research Directions for Security and Networking in ... QNX Software Systems, Ltd., BAE Systems, Kestrel Technology, BBN Technologies. 14 ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:36
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 15
Provided by: HGi77


Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: Panel Perspective: Research Directions for Security and Networking in Critical Real-Time and Embedded Systems

Panel Perspective Research Directions for
Security and Networking in Critical Real-Time and
Embedded Systems
  • Helen Gill, Ph.D.
  • National Science Foundation

RTAS Workshop, San Jose, CA April 4, 2006
High Confidence Systems Technical Challenge
"Systems of Embedded Systems"
  • Now information focus, human-machine interface
  • Operator skill, competent human intervention
  • System, operator certification
  • Future open, multi-level closed loop, mixed
    initiative, autonomous systems and multi-systems
  • Typical domains
  • Medical plug and play operating room of the
  • Aviation mixed manned, autonomous flight
  • Power systems Future SCADA-D/PCS for
    distributed generation, renewable energy
  • National Security common operating picture,
    global information grid, future combat systems

Networking An Outsiders View
  • Traditional networking perspective Core Edge
  • Core Bulk packet delivery system
  • Other issues largely delegated to edge networks
  • Internet technology is pervasive as an enabling
    technology for enterprise systems but (though
    used for distributed real-time applications) has
    not penetrated real-time sensing and control
    networks (FlexRay, CAN, )
  • Sensor Nets perspective just attach sensors
    and actuators at the edge, provide services in
    network (sensor grids)
  • Gaps
  • Topology control for complex real-time systems
    with wide-area characteristics (remote surgery
    operating room of the future power grid control)
  • Do old assumptions (statistical properties of
    network under multi-path) apply under topology
    slicing, real-time QoS?
  • What are the security challenges if these
    assumptions change (e.g., circuits map topology
    to physical resources)?
  • Concerns
  • Static layered view, little discourse on
    autonomous vs. application-determined network
    management, operation

Cyber Security An Outsiders View
  • Traditional cyber security perspective
    information assurance
  • Frameworks for protection (crypto,
    authentication/authorization, information access
    control, detection, recovery)
  • Premise Data-oriented, rather than
    process-oriented protection
  • Simple principles isolation (e.g., separation
    kernels), non-interference, subject/object
    classifications and compartmentalization,
    (insider threat?)
  • Gaps
  • System-system coordination, reconfiguration,
    reactive systems, authorization of human
    information access vs. autonomous
    cooperative/competitive real-time operation (more
    than mere delegation of authorized information
  • Concerns
  • Secondary focus, limited impact of cyber security
    research on systems research (exceptions PKI,
    IDS, VPN), especially for time-critical systems
  • Disconnect from other QoS issues

Real-Time SystemsAn Outsiders View
  • Traditional real-time sytems perspective
  • Closed, single-system frameworks, persistent
    scheduling decisions (though growing corpus on
    dynamic scheduling)
  • Process scheduling and control perspective,
    extension to energy management
  • Hard real-time scheduling for single-system
    provisioning of cyclic workload, limited
    dependent task scheduling, best-effort soft
  • Indirect treatment of concurrency, distributed
  • Loose relationship to changing embedded sensing
    and control system requirements (need to close
    loops at higher levels)
  • Must continue to build above a weak technology
    base single-system RTOS x Middleware x RTVM
  • Gaps
  • Real-time reconfiguration, real-time
    coordination, deep integration of networking and
    security services, preparation for technology
    diversity and change (e.g., multi-core/multi-threa
    ding models)
  • Concerns
  • Lack of end-to-end characterization controlled
    system dynamics, discontinuous security and
    network interactions, resource models, time-aware
    trust/certainty models

Worried Observations
  • Eyes on the trail phenomenon
  • My community has the solution perspective
  • Power grid collapse is just a cyber security
  • Power grid collapse is just a real-time problem
  • Power grid collapse is just a networking/communica
    tion problem
  • Power grid collapse is just a control problem
  • (hardware platforms, )
  • High-level wisdom is widely believed to suffice
  • All we need is dependability (please refer to
    the taxonomy)
  • Networked embedded control system design is just
    anapplication problem
  • Its all software (unrefined concept), and
    better software engineering will take care of it

Some obvious steps forward
  • Break down the stovepipe boundaries
  • End-to-end, cross-disciplinary systems problems
  • Closing the loop sharpens the mind so consider
    real killer apps (e.g., safety critical), not
    just cell phones
  • Move beyond performance, information, enterprise,
  • Teams mixed expertise is necessary
  • Ask What core research would yield real
  • NOT system instance by system instance
  • NOT tunnel vision on isolated, single-discipline
  • Ask What are some fundamental, shared (and
    complexity-removing) research questions?
  • Ask What would a better technology base look

Thank You for Your Help
RD Planning for CIP and High Confidence Systems
  • NSTC Committee structure
  • CT Committee on Technology
  • Networking, IT RD (NITRD)
  • Subcommittee, blue book
  • Infrastructure Subcommittee
  • CIP RD Planning
  • National CIP RD Plan
  • CIIP RD Plan
  • NITRD RD Planning - High Confidence Software and
    Systems (HCSS) Coordinating Group
  • Large Scale Networking (LSN) Coordinating Group
  • Cyber Security and Information Assurance (CSIA)
    Interagency Working Group



NITRD HCSS Coordinating Group Assessment Actions
  • Backdrop
  • NSF/OSTP Critical Infrastructure Protection
    Workshop, Leesburg, VA, September 2002,
  • NSF Workshop, on CIP for SCADA, Minneapolis MN,
    October 2003
  • http//
  • National Academies study Sufficient Evidence?
    Design for Certifiably Dependable Systems,
  • National Coordination Office summary report(s)
    derived from workshops, industry input sessions,
    NAS study

NITRD HCSS Coordinating Group Assessment Actions
  • High Confidence Medical Device Software and
    Systems (HCMDSS),
  • Planning Workshop, Arlington VA, November 2004,
  • National RD Road-Mapping Workshop, Philadelphia,
    Pennsylvania, June 2005, http//
  • High Confidence Aviation Systems
  • Planning Workshop on Software for Critical
    Aviation Systems, Seattle, WA, November 21-22,
  • National RD Road-Mapping Workshop, venue TBD,
    August 2006

HCSS Workshops, continued
  • High Confidence Critical Infrastructures Beyond
    SCADA and Distributed Control Systems
  • Planning
  • US Planning Workshop, Washington, DC, March
    14-15, 2006
  • EU-US Collaboration Workshop, Framework Programme
    7 linkage, March 16-17, 2006
  • US National RD Road-Mapping Workshop, October,

Other Current HCSS Actions Assessment of
Real-Time Operating System (RTOS) Technology Base
  • Starting point single-system RTOS products,
    middleware appliqué for distributed systems,
    rudimentary open sensing and control platforms
    (incompatible schedulers, single-issue
    architectural assumptions, weak security
    services, )
  • Needed Clean OS-level support for open,
    hierarchical control systems, dynamic topology,
    coordinated action
  • So what are we doing about this?
  • HCSS RTOS technology assessment, vendor
    non-disclosure briefings
  • Integrators Adventium Laboratory, Boeing, Ford
    Motor Company, Lockheed Martin, MIT Lincoln
    Laboratory, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon. Rockwell
    Collins, MotoTron
  • Technology Sun Microsystems, IBM, Microsoft,
    Honeywell, Red Hat, Wind River Systems, Green
    Hills, LinuxWorks, Real-Time Innovations, Inc.,
    QNX Software Systems, Ltd., BAE Systems, Kestrel
    Technology, BBN Technologies

High-Confidence Software and Systems(HCSS)
  • Air Force Research Laboratories
  • Army Research Office
  • Department of Defense/ OSD
  • Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
  • Department of Energy
  • Federal Aviation Administration
  • Food and Drug Administration
  • National Air Space Administration
  • National Institutes of Health
  • National Institute of Science and Technology
  • National Science Foundation
  • National Security Agency
  • Office of Naval Research
  • Cooperating agencies
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)